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NOMINATION OF MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ

MAY 20 (legislative day, MAY 19), 1986.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. LUGAR, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following

REPORT

together with

MINORITY VIEWS

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the nomination of Morton I. Abramowitz, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the nomination be confirmed.

BACKGROUND

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, fiscal years 1986 and 1987, upgraded the position of Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Department of State, to the level of Assistant Secretary. The incumbent, Morton I. Abramowitz, was nominated to become Assistant Secretary.

A hearing on the nomination of Mr. Abramowitz and others was held on March 5, 1986. Senator Lugar presided. At the request of Senator Helms, a second hearing was held on April 29, 1986. On that occasion, Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead also appeared on the nominee's behalf. Senator Helms presided.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

All required papers on Mr. Abramowitz have been submitted, and the committee finds them to be in order. The nominee's background and qualifications have been examined on paper and in the course of extensive hearings.

Mr. Abramowitz has had a long and distinguished career in the Foreign Service. After graduating from Stanford and Harvard and

71-119 O

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serving in the Army, Mr. Abramowitz spent 3 years with the International Cooperation Administration. In 1960, he embarked on his foreign service career as a consular-economic officer in Taipei. He served in various posts in the Far East and them returned to the Department. He first served as a staff member of the Inter-Department Group, in the department, dealing with such issues as policy on Korea and formulation of policy on the Micronesian transition from the trusteeship arrangement. As special assistant to Under Secretary Elliot Richardson, Mr. Abramowitz dealt with a wide range of issues, including initial steps to ease economic restrictions on trade with the People's Republic of China. In 1971 and 1972, he began applying his Far East expertise as an intelligence professional in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. His experience was again widened and developed when he went on to serve in the Department of Defense from 1972 to 1978, dealing with such issues as regional base arrangements, U.S. troop levels, and defense relations with the Republic of Korea.

In 1978, Mr. Abramowitz was appointed as Ambassador to Thailand. In 1983 and 1984, he went on to be Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna, Austria.

In February, 1985, Mr. Abramowitz returned to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, this time as Director. When the position was upgraded by the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, fiscal years 1986 and 1987, Secretary Shultz recommended that the President nominate the incumbent director as Assistant Secretary.

In 1976, Mr. Abramowitz received the Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Award. Two years later, he was given the Secretary of Defense Distinguished Service Award. He also received the Joseph C. Wilson Award for Distinction in International Affairs in 1980 from the University of Rochester, and the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Service in 1981.

Throughout his career, Mr. Abramowitz has been recognized for his scholarship. In 1970, he was detailed to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and in 1982, to the Rand Corporation. He has also written a book, *Remaking China Policy,* and a number of articles on Taiwan and Korea.

The committee finds Mr. Abramowitz qualified and fit for the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.

COMMITTEE ACTION

At its business meeting on May 14, 1986, the Committee on Foreign Relations voted 16 to 1 to report Mr. Abramowitz' nomination favorably, and to recommend that the Senate confirm his nomination. Voting in the affirmative were Senators Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Murkowski, Trible, Evans, Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Cranston, Dodd, Eagleton and Kerry, Voting in the negative was Senator Helms.

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR JESSE HELMS

The nomination of Mr. Abramowitz brings together a number of deeply troubling issues.

In my view, however, these issues may be summarized under two headings. The first is the question of imposing the reform of our foreign policy system upon a bureaucracy strongly resisting such reform; the second is the content of what the reforms should be.

Indeed, the nomination of Mr. Abramowitz is virtually a referendum on reform. Mr. Abramowitz is a strongly polarizing personality. Those who oppose reform, and want to continue the direction which our foreign policy has taken for the past 40 years, will very eagerly uphold Mr. Abramowitz. On the other hand, those who believe that the foreign policy elite should be accountable to the American people should be strongly opposed to Mr. Abramowitz.

The policy that Mr. Abramowitz stands for is one that has been central to the thinking of the foreign policy elite inside and outside of our government since the end of World War II.

This central idea is that the confrontation between Communism and freedom is the most dangerous problem faced by the world today. These elitists think that the critical function of U.S. diplomacy is to manage the transition to a world in which both the Communist countries and the free countries can agree on the same values.

The policies recommended to achieve this impossible aim are always the same. First, they argue that the national interests of the United States require us to adopt the goals of the socialist and Communist countries as a long-term policy to avoid war; the art of diplomacy, therefore, is the timing of the steps to reach those goals in a manner that will avoid turmoil, disruption of the economic system, and cataclysmic upheavals ending in slaughter. The fact that freedom will diminish, and eventually disappear, is considered unfortunate, but not a vital interest to be defended.

It is to be expected, of course, that the American people are not yet ready to be so flexible. Achieving the goals of the elitist policy requires secret diplomacy and patient, slow steps to place in motion irrevocable decisions before the public wakes up. When the public does wake up, it is too late to restore the conditions which will allow freedom to exist.

Mr. Abramowitz is the perfect example of this syndrome. His nomination to be Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research places him in one of the key policy-making positions in the State Department. But when he came before the Committee, he adopted the extraordinary position that the post for which he was nominated did not deal with policy, therefore he declined to answer any questions relating to policy.

Such a position makes a mockery of the Constitutional role of the U.S. Senate in offering advice and consent to Presidential

nominees. If the Senate may not ask substantive questions relating to the nominee's experience and views, how is it possible to judge his qualifications for office?

At a second hearing, the Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Whitehead, told the Committee that it was the Department of State's position that "the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in determining the qualifications of a candidate, has the right to ask the candidate questions about any relevant subject, including the candidate's views on our foreign policy, if he has any." Mr. Abramowitz therefore dutifully responded to a line of questioning which he had previously rejected.

It was perhaps only by chance that the original line of questioning, so forcefully rejected by Mr. Abramowitz, had to do with the Republic of China on Taiwan. At the time of the original hearing, I had been involved in a series of intelligence briefings on the proposed sale of advanced avionics to Red China, and I was deeply concerned with the impact on Taiwan of this transfer of technology to the Communists. I could see from the briefings that selection, presentation, and analysis of technical data relating to the installation of the avionics could very profoundly affect the policy decisions in this matter. A bias towards Red China and against Taiwan could very well influence the presentation of intelligence data, and skew the decision.

The crucial question was whether or not Mr. Abramowitz could separate objective analysis from ideological crusade.

Not knowing where Mr. Abramowitz stood on these matters, I asked him the following question: "Do you think that the United States Government should take any steps which would have the effect of encouraging the Republic of China to negotiate its future with Communist China?" It was one of only four questions I had planned to ask.

As far as I knew, it was unprecedented for a friendly witness to refuse to answer a relevant question, particularly a nominee seeking an office of high trust and responsibility. What could Mr. Abramowitz have to hide?

What I didn't know then was that in 1970 Mr. Abramowitz had written a book entitled "Remaking China Policy," a monograph arguing that, in order to "improve" relations with Communist China, we had to convince Peking that we were sincere in doing something about the Taiwan "problem." Among the steps he recommended were the following:

(1) That we should not fight too hard to keep Taiwan in the United Nations,

(2) That we should convince Peking we are serious about the Taiwan issue by adoping the policy that "there is but one China, and Taiwan is its province,"

(3) That we should not allow Taiwan to become militarily independent,

(4) That we should step-by-step move towards the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, and

(5) That we should always allow our policy toward Peking to be guided by the goal of convincing Taiwan that it is in their best interest to accept autonomy or some other arrangement under Peking's sovereignty.

Although all these steps have since become U.S. policy under four Presidents, in 1970 none of these events had yet happened. The American people, and the U.S. Congress were strongly opposed to the betrayal of the freedom and independence of the Republic of China. In fact, those views were a radical reaffirmation of the pro-Communist line of the 1940's, put forward by the stout defenders of Mao Tse-tung, such as Edgar P. Snow, John K. Fairbank, and Owen Lattimore.

In those days, so-called experts such as John K. Fairbank, could write:

> The Chinese Communist Party has capitalized upon this pressure for change. It has become the acknowledged champion of agrarian reform—in a land of farmers—and has thereby set up its claim to be the party of progress. Chinese intellectuals generally recognize that the Communist Party is the party of change and is now the leading force in the Chinese revolutionary process . . . We should also note that humanitarianism is an important part of the Chinese Communist dogma. Whatever may have happened in Russia, this ideal has not yet been perverted in Communist China, and Communist cadres there are sincerely intent on the uplifting and regeneration of their fellowmen. (Atlantic Monthly, September 1946)

With friends like that, the Communists don't need to have Communists in the United States to attain their goals. The actions of the U.S. government in withdrawing support from the Chinese Nationalists resulted in the Communist take-over of the Mainland in 1949. These events were carefully documented by such scholars as Dr. Anthony Kubek in "How the Far East Was Lost."

Despite the Commuinst take-over, there still remained the "Taiwan problem"—that is, the continued existence of the Nationalist government of Free China, which stood as a rebuke to the existence of the Communist government in Peking. The China hands of the 1940's were not able to solve the "Taiwan problem." That was to be left to the new generation.

It is not surprising that Mr. Abramowitz was a pupil of Professor Faribank at Harvard, nor that Dr. Fairbank contributed a laudatory introduction to his book, nor that Mr. Abramowitz testified that he still considers Dr. Fairbank to be one of the foremost scholars on China. The fact the policies advocated by Mr. Abramowitz in 1970 have all been adopted does not make them any the less reprehensible.

The goals proposed by Mr. Abramowitz, and the policies adopted by the United States are identical to the goals of the Communist regime in Peking. They constitute a betrayal of the Republic of China and of the people of the United States. This view was summed up by Ronald Reagan in 1978 in a speech reported in the Los Angeles Times.

The future President told his audience then that

> Americans are not willing to "normalize" relations on Peking's terms. "Normalization now" is the view of a few U.S. scholars and does not represent the widespread feel-

> ings of intellectual and political leaders. A Brown University study indicates that 93% of 1,800 leaders surveyed believe the United States should not accept Peking's "three conditions" in order to achieve normalization. The "three conditions" involve breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan, breaking a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan signed in 1954, and withdrawing our remaining military advisers from Taiwan. The American people continue to express their strong belief that abandoning a good friend and ally to an unknown fate in order to normalize relations with Peking is not worth the price of America's credibility.

Mr. Abramowitz was apparently among the "few scholars" who were promoting the sell-out of Taiwan. Throughout Mr. Abramowitz's career in the government, almost every position he held touched on China policy in some way, except for a brief stint in Europe. For example, in the crucial months leading up to the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, he was the principal adviser on arms policy in Asia to the Pentagon.

It is remarkable that Mr. Abramowitz's book, although it purports to deal with remaking China policy, completely omits any reference to the fact that China is governed by a ruthless Communist dictatorship. The word "Communist" does not appear in the book. The word "Marxist" does not appear. There is no reference to the fact that China is governed by the central committee of a one-party system. There is indeed no reference to the decision-making system of China at all, or to its ruthless and inhumane policies towards the Chinese people.

This lack of perspective is very disturbing in a person appointed to be the Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Research (INR). For example, Mr. Abramowitz prepares the daily morning briefing for Secretary Shultz. I have received comments from State Department officials, past and present CIA officials, NSC staff, and DOD officials about an alleged politicization of the INR products, particularly with regard to Korea, Taiwan, Communist China, Thailand, and the Philippines. I hope that that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will undertake a review of the INR output since Mr. Abramowitz first became Director of INR last year to see to what extent it differs from the output of other intelligence agencies. If the same bias exhibited in Mr. Abramowitz's book is evident in the INR products, then our problems at the State Department are worse than is already apparent.

The bottom line is the question of how a President can get control of foreign policy when he is served by a permanent bureaucracy that may not be in sympathy with reform and change. We all know that it is one thing to order change; it is another thing to get those changes carried out.

Under the law, we have set up a mechanism which is supposed to enable any administration to control policy through the appointment of political nominees to the key posts for making and advocating of policy. There are 8,000 domestic jobs in the Department of State. There are only 246 of these, aside from Ambassadorial posts,

which deal with policy-making and therefore are exempt from being filled by civil service or career foreign service employees.

It seems reasonable to assume that any Administration should take care to see that all 246 are filled by men and women who are philosophically in sympathy with whatever President has been elected by the people of the United States. In that way, the policies that are developed and advocated can be evaluated by persons who are expert in analyzing the political impact, as well as the technical impact, of any proposed policy.

Out of the 246 jobs open to political appointment, only 25 of the top 27 jobs in the State Department come to the Senate for its advice and consent—the Ambassadorial slots, of course, excepted. These top 27 jobs range from the Secretary himself down to Executive Level VI. Setting aside the Secretary and his Deputy, of course, there are only four members of the President's party in these key control slots. Indeed, the majority of these 25 key political slots are held by career service individuals who come from outside the political system. Is it any wonder that the President can't get control of foreign policy?

The nomination of Mr. Abramowitz is symptomatic of the disease which affects our foreign policy. The only cure is reform, and there will be no reform as long as Mr. Abramowitz and his peers control the system.

JESSE HELMS.